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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
•pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(j) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the District Court correctly held as a 
matter of law that the McDonald's Corporation ("McDonald's") 
development is not urban development under U.C.A. 10-2-418 
because a proper construction of that statute requires that 
land, fixtures, equipment, furnishings and other personal 
property be excluded from cost projections. 
2. Whether the District Court correctly ruled as a 
matter of law that Salt Lake County complied with its zoning 
ordinance in approving the McDonald's development. 
3. Whether the District Court Correctly held that Sandy 
City ("Sandy") is barred under the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel from relitigating issues relating to U.C.A. 10-2-418, 
which issues were decided adversely to Sandy in a related case. 
4. Whether the District Court correctly decided that 
Sandy did not express a willingness to annex the McDonald's 
property prior to approval by Salt Lake County of McDonald's 
conditional use permit. 
5. Whether the District Court correctly held that Sandy 
was barred from bringing this action against McDonald's under 
the doctrine of laches. 
6. Whether the District Court correctly granted 
McDonald's motion to strike the affidavit of Gary Free. 
All issues are matters of law subject to review by this 
Court for correctness. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 
1988). 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The determinative statutory provisions for this appeal 
1. Utah Code Annotated 10-2-418 (1979), which reads as 
follows: 
Urban development shall not be 
approved or permitted within one-half 
mile of a municipality in the 
unincorporated territory which the 
municipality has proposed for municipal 
expansion in its policy declaration, if 
a municipality is willing to annex the 
territory proposed for such development 
under the standards and requirements set 
forth in this chapter; provided, 
however, that a property owner desiring 
to develop or improve property within 
the said one-half mile area may notify 
the municipality in writing of said 
desire and identify with particularity 
all legal and factual barriers 
preventing an annexation to the 
municipality. At the end of 12 
consecutive months from the filing with 
the municipality of said notice and 
after a good faith and diligent effort 
by said property owner to annex, said 
property owner may develop as otherwise 
permitted by law. Urban development 
beyond one-half mile of a municipality 
may be restricted or an impact statement 
required when agreed to in an interlocal 
agreement, under the provisions of the 
Interlocal Co-operation Act. 
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2. Utah Code Annotated 10-1-104(11) (1979), which reads 
as follows: 
(11) "Urban development" means a 
housing subdivision involving more than 
15 residential units with an average of 
less than one acre per residential unit 
or a commercial or industrial develop-
ment for which cost projections exceed 
$750,000 for any or all phases, 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In two District Court cases brought by Sandy, Salt Lake 
County has had to defend the approval of the same McDonald's 
restaurant located in an unincorporated area of the county. In 
this, the second case, Sandy attempted to raise the same issues 
concerning urban development under U.C.A. 10-2-418 which were 
decided against Sandy in the earlier case. The District Court 
correctly held that Sandy was barred under the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel from relitigating those issues. 
The District Court also correctly decided the substantive 
issues concerning the meaning of U.C.A. 10-2-418 (hereinafter 
also cited as "§418"). That statute is not applicable to this 
case as the development costs for the McDonald's restaurant 
were less than $750,000.00. Land costs and fixture, equipment 
and furnishing costs are not development costs which are 
reviewed by a county as part of its development approval 
process and do not relate to the impact of development on an 
area and therefore should not be included as development costs 
for purposes of §418. When those costs are excluded from the 
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development costs, the evidence is undisputed that the cost of 
the McDonald's restaurant is under $750,000.00. 
The evidence is also clear that the approval by Salt Lake 
County of the McDonald's restaurant was in compliance with Salt 
Lake County ordinances. Although the Little Cottonwood 
District Master Plan is outdated in some respects because of 
extensive development in the southern part of Salt Lake County, 
including approval by Sandy City of an extensive mall 
immediately across the street from the McDonald's restaurant, 
it is still legally in effect. 
The District Court correctly held that the complaint 
against McDonald's was barred under the doctrine of laches, 
that §418 is not applicable because Sandy did not express a 
willingness to annex the McDonald's property, and that the 
affidavit of Gary Free was not admissible in this case. In 
order to avoid duplication, Salt Lake County adopts McDonald's 
brief on these three issues. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF CASE AND DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT. 
On June 14, 1988, Sandy filed a complaint in Third 
District Court against McDonald's, Salt Lake County, and the 
Salt Lake County Planning Commission ("Planning Commission"). 
It sought an extraordinary writ and declaratory and injunctive 
relief to void a decision by the Board of County Commissioners 
of Salt Lake County ("Board of County Commissioners") on 
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December 9, 1988, upholding Planning Commission approval of a 
conditional use permit for a McDonald's restaurant on 1.3 acres 
of land located at approximately 1300 East and 10550 South 
within an unincorporated area of Salt Lake County, 
The complaint also sought to have McDonald's remove all 
buildings constructed on the property or to comply with 
annexation codes and to bring the property into compliance wiLh 
the Sandy City Development Code. R.15. 
Motions for summary judgment were filed by McDonald's and 
Salt Lake County in August of 1988 and by Sandy City in January 
of 1989. R.118, R.223 and R.350. McDonald's also filed a 
motion to dismiss and a motion to strike an affidavit of Gary 
Free filed by Sandy. R.350. On April 10, 1989, the District 
Court, Judge J. Dennis Frederick presiding, heard and granted 
McDonald's and Salt Lake County's motions for summary 
judgment. Sandy's motion for summary judgment was denied. 
McDonald's motion to dismiss and motion to strike were also 
granted. R.573. On May 3, 1988, Judge Frederick entered an 
Order granting summary judgment and dismissing Sandy's 
complaint. R.581. (Addendum A.) 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
A. BACKGROUND AND CHEVRON DEVELOPMENT. 
1. In April of 1988, McDonald's predecessors in 
interest, Priest, Yeates, Kjar and Smoot ("Sellers"), applied 
to Salt Lake County to have approximately 4.18 acres of 
property ("original property"), located on the northwest corner 
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of the intersection of 1300 East and 10600 South in 
unincorporated Salt Lake County, zoned from Residential R-l-8 
(8,000 square foot single family lots) to Residential R-M/ZC • 
and Commercial C-2. R.209. 
2. The original property is located within the 
area covered by the Little Cottonwood Master Plan, which is 
part of the Salt Lake County Master Plan, R.222. 
3. After receiving a favorable recommendation from 
the Planning Commission, the Board of County Commissioners 
approved the application on August 5, 1987. R.166. 
4. On August 16, 1987, Chevron, U.S.A. applied for 
a conditional use permit to build a Chevron station on .7 acres 
of the original property. The Planning Commission heard the 
application on September 23, 1987 and granted the application 
on October 13, 1987. R.166.' 
5. Sandy filed a complaint in the Third District 
Court against Salt Lake County, the Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission, sellers Postero-Blecker (agent for Chevron) and 
Chevron, U.S.A. on November 6, 1987. The action involved not 
only the Chevron parcel but also the entire original property, 
including the 1.3 acre McDonald's parcel. R.165. 
6. The position asserted by Sandy in the Chevron 
action included the claim that development of the original 
1
 The ZC designation attached certain conditions limiting 
the height of buildings and the nature of uses that could be 
developed on the original property. R.179. 
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property, including the McDonald's parcel, constituted urban 
development within the meaning of U.C.A. 10-2-418 and that the 
owners had not attempted to annex the property to Sandy. 
R.170-173. 
7. On March 15, 1988, the District Court in the 
Chevron action granted summary judgment for defendants, ruling 
against Sandy on all claims. R.198, Memorandum Decision. 
(Addendum B.) Sandy appealed the decision of the District 
Court and the matter is now pending in the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
B. MCDONALD'S DEVELOPMENT. 
8. On or about July 5, 1987, McDonald's entered 
into negotiations with the Sellers to purchase approximately 
1.3 acres of the original property. R.119. The real estate 
contract between McDonald's and the Sellers was executed on 
October 12, 1987. R.101. 
9. On September 30, 1987, McDonald's filed an 
application with Salt Lake County for a conditional use permit 
to build a McDonald's restaurant on the 1.3 acres. The 
projected cost of the restaurant on the application is 
$300,000.00. R.103-104. 
10. After hearing the matter, the Planning 
Commission approved the McDonald's application on October 24, 
1987 (R.97) and approved findings on November 27, 1987. R.220. 
11. Sandy opposed the McDonald's development 
although it had approved development of a large commercial mall 
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which now exists within Sandy boundaries directly to the east 
of the McDonald's parcel. R. 187. 
12. On November 4, 1987, Sandy appealed to the 
Board of County Commissioners the Planning Commission decision 
approving the McDonald's application. The Board of County 
Commissioners heard the appeal and upheld the decision of the 
Planning Commission on December 9, 1987. R.83-84. Findings 
supporting the decision of the Board of County Commissioners 
were issued by the Board on January 13, 1988. R.268. 
13. McDonald's began construction of its restaurant 
on April 25, 1988. R.100-102. The actual cost of constructing 
the restaurant, exclusive of decorating, kitchen equipment, 
furnishings and land costs, was $272,999.00. Site work was an 
additional $87,486.00. R.358-365. 
14. On June 13, 1988, over six months after the 
decision of the Board of County Commissioners approving the 
McDonald's restaurant, Sandy filed this action against 
McDonald's and Salt Lake County. R.l-17. 
-8-
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SANDY'S CLAIMS CONCERNING URBAN DEVELOP-
MENT ARE BARRED UNDER THE DOCTRINES OF 
RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. 
Under Utah law there are two branches of res judicata: 
claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Swainston v. 
Intermountain Health Care, 766 P. 2d 1059 (Utah 1988); Penrod v. 
Nu Creation Cream, Inc., 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983). Issue 
preclusion, often referred to as collateral estoppel, prevents 
relitigation of issues that have been litigated and determined 
in a previous action although the claims in the two actions may 
be different. Penrod v. Nu Creation Cream, Inc. , supra. The 
test for issue preclusion is as follows: 
1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication 
identical with the one presented in the action in question? 
2. Was there a final judgment on the merits? 
3. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a 
party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication? 
4. Was the issue in the first case competently, fully 
and fairly litigated? Swainston v. Intermountain Health Care, 
_Inc_._/ supra. 
Sandy, in its brief, claims there are separate issues 
relating to "cost projections" for the McDonald's restaurant 
not relating to the Chevron case. This contention ignores the 
record in the Chevron case. The defendants in the Chevron 
complaint include Salt Lake County, the Salt Lake County 
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Planning Commission and McDonald's predecessors in interest. 
The allegations in the complaint relate to the entire 4.18 
acres of the original property, including the McDonald's 
parcel. R.165. Sandy argued in its motion for summary 
judgment in the Chevron case that the costs of the McDonald's 
development should be included as costs in the development of 
the Chevron parcel. R.442, 443, 445, 456. Pursuant to a 
motion by Sandy, the entire record of the County proceedings in 
McDonald's application was included in the record of the 
Chevron case. 
The court in the Chevron case in its memorandum decision 
held that "fixtures and personal property" should not be 
considered as costs for purposes of U.C.A. 10-2-418 and that 
the costs of the Chevron development and the McDonald's 
development together did not exceed $750,000.00. R.199-200. 
Thus, in the Chevron case Sandy litigated the issue of what 
costs should be included for purposes of §418 and also 
litigated the issue of the costs of the McDonald's 
development. Sandy lost that case and cannot now relitigate 
the same issues concerning the same property. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT 
THE MCDONALD'S DEVELOPMENT IS NOT URBAN 
DEVELOPMENT UNDER U.C.A. 10-2-418. 
A. THIS IS NOT AN ANNEXATION CASE. 
Sandy, in its brief, treats this case as if it were an 
annexation case with regard to whether the McDonald's 
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development is urban development under U.C.A. 10-2-418. Utah 
Code Ann. 10-2-418, as pertinent, reads as follows: 
10-2-418. Urban development restric-
tions. Urban development shall not be 
approved or permitted within one-half 
mile of a municipality in the 
unincorporated territory which the 
municipality has proposed for municipal 
expansion in its policy declaration, if 
a municipality is willing to annex the 
territory proposed for such development 
under the standards and requirements set 
forth in this chapter;.... 
The term "urban development" is defined in Utah Code Ann. 
10-1-104(11) which states: 
(11) "Urban development" means a 
housing subdivision involving more than 
15 residential units with an average of 
less than one acre per residential unit 
or a commercial or industrial develop-
ment for which cost projections exceed 
$750,000 for any or all phases. 
No petition for annexation of the McDonald's property to 
Sandy City was filed by the property owners. Obviously, 
McDonald's chose not to annex* its property to Sandy since Sandy 
opposed commercial development of this property. 
Sandy argues that the legislature intended that 
"urbanized areas" should be within cities. Under the law this 
is true only in unincorporated areas where a high quality of 
urban services are needed.2 U.C.A. 10-2-401(3). Obviously, 
* Counties have been granted almost identical powers as 
cities to provide and separately fund urban type services. 
U.C.A. 17-5-1 through 17-5-88 (powers and authority of 
counties); U.C.A. 17-34-1 through 17-34-5 (municipal services 
to unincorporated areas); U.C.A. 10-8-1 through 10-8-89 (powers 
and authority of cities). 
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McDonald's did not need any Sandy services because it chose not 
to annex. Utah laws governing annexation also require that 
annexations be drawn along logical geographic boundaries. 
U.C.A. 10-2-414. If Sandy annexed this piece of property, it 
would carve out almost the only commercial development within a 
large unincorporated residential area of White City. R.339. 
The point is that the legislative intent with regard to 
the meaning of U.C.A. 10-2-418 should not be interpreted to 
favor either cities or counties since Utah annexation law 
expresses a number of different policies and requirements that 
govern annexations. U.C.A. 10-2-401, 10-2-414. Rather, the 
legislative intent with regard to §418 should be interpreted 
based on the normal understanding of the meaning of the 
language in the act and the process by which counties review 
proposed development. 
B. THE MCDONALD'S RESTAURANT WAS NOT DEVELOPED IN "PHASES." 
Sandy correctly observes in its brief that the words "any 
or all phases" in U.C.A. 10-2-104(11) should be interpreted 
according to its normally understood usage. The County agrees 
that this is the standard this Court applies in statutory 
interpretation. Durfey v. Bd. of Education of Wayne County 
School District, 604 P. 2d 480 (Utah 1979); West Jordan v. 
Morrison, 656 P.2d 445 (Utah 1982). Sandy then gives the term 
a tortured interpretation, arguing that "any or all phases" 
means, in essence, the process a development goes through from 
the time it is conceived to the time it is open for business 
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and therefore should include all costs which are "essential" 
for that development. Using this approach, development costs 
should include planning costs, attorney's fees, real estate 
costs, franchise fees, corporate overhead, personal property 
and equipment, and any other costs which could be considered as 
a "phase" of the development. 
This is not, however, the commonly understood meaning of 
the term "phase" when used in conjunction with the term 
"development." When a sign advertises a "phased development," 
the County submits that the developer is not notifying the 
public that it intends to buy the land, construct the buildings 
and then install the equipment and furnishings; rather, the 
developer is notifying the public that it intends to build the 
development in parts or stages. For example, the first 40 
units (first phase) of a proposed 80-unit condominium 
development, or the initial wing (first phase) of an office 
complex developed in timed stages are "phased developments." 
The McDonald's restaurant was not developed in separate 
"phases" as that term is used in §418. The entire restaurant 
development was constructed in one phase. 
C- LAND COSTS SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN PROJECTING COSTS 
UNDER U-C.A. 10-2-418. 
The intent and wording of U.C.A. §10-1-104(11) do not 
support Sandy's position that land value at the time a proposed 
development is being reviewed by a county should be included in 
determining "cost projections" for the development. Since the 
statute uses the term "cost," and not "value," the dollar 
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amount applicable to the land would vary greatly depending on 
when the current developer purchased the land. If the land had 
been owned by the developer for a long period of time, the cost 
likely would be much less than the cost of the same piece of 
land purchased recently. Often the developer leases the land 
and there is no actual purchase cost or the proposed 
development may involve an expansion of an existing development 
not involving any additional land. Thus, if land cost is 
included for determining cost projections, the result would be 
arbitrary, depending on the date and the nature of the land 
transaction and the nature of the development. 
If the legislature had intended land value to be part of 
the cost of development, it would have used the term "value" 
and not "cost." Also, the legislature used the term "cost 
projections," which implies a future cost and not one that may 
already had been incurred years before the time of the proposed 
development. 
Most important, the cost of land has no relationship to 
the obvious purpose of §418, that of limiting the ability of 
the County to approve substantial physical improvements to land 
that could affect an area which a city may annex in the 
future. It is the development of the land, not the land 
itself, that affects planning decisions and impacts an area. 
The ordinary understanding of the term "development" relates to 
construction which changes the character of the land. City of 
Louisville v. District Court, Cty. of Boulder, 54 3 P. 2d 6 7 
(Colo. 1975). 
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If the cost of the land is excluded from Sandy's own 
appraisal, the appraisal would not establish that the cost of 
development would be over $750,000.00, only that it would be in 
a range somewhere between $650,000.00 and $825,000.00. But 
even that range improperly included fixtures, equipment and 
furnishings in the calculation. 
D. FIXTURES, EQUIPMENT AND FURNISHING COSTS SHOULD NOT BE 
INCLUDED AS COSTS UNDER SECTION 418. 
In its efforts to push the cost of the McDonald's 
development over $750,000,00, Sandy erroneously included 
restaurant fixtures, equipment and furnishings in its 
appraisal- In determining the kinds of costs the legislature 
intended to include for purposes of §418, the wording of the 
statute is again helpful. Section 418 states that urban 
development "shall not be approved or permitted" by counties 
under certain specified circumstances. Thus, the time at which 
the legislature intended a county to make a decision as to 
whether a proposed office or commercial development is urban 
development is when the developer applies for a permit to 
develop.3 
It is not reasonable to believe that the legislature 
intended that the County speculate on what kind of internal 
fixtures, equipment and furnishings will end up in an office or 
Some uses under the Salt Lake County zoning ordinance, 
such as the McDonald's application, require a conditional. use 
permit prior to application by the developer for a building 
permit. Other uses only require a building permit. 
-15-
commercial development. That may have been possible to some 
extent in the case of the McDonald's development, assuming it 
has a standardized operation; however, in most cases, such a 
determination would not be possible, 
A good example of this is the approval process for a 
commercial office building. In many situations, when the 
County reviews an application for an office building, the owner 
does not have any or all of the specific tenants in mind. How 
the offices will be furnished and equipped is later decided by 
each tenant, after the building has been approved and 
constructed and the offices leased. Most of these items do not 
even require any kind of County approval. Often such 
furnishings and equipment later change as tenants change. 
Also, as in the case of raw land, internal fixtures, 
furnishings and equipment have no impact on land use for an 
area that a city may want to annex in the future. 
When these items are eliminated from the development 
costs, the evidence is undisputed that the cost of the 
McDonald's development is well under $750,000.00. 
Under Sandy's position that equipment and furnishings 
should be included in costs of development, the change in 
equipment installed years after construction, such as the 
installation of a new computer, could trigger the applicability 
of §418, in which case the County would have some obligation to 
prevent the installation. In such a case, the County, or the 
developer, would not be able to project such costs at the time 
of the application. 
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POINT III 
THE APPROVAL OF THE MCDONALD'S APPLICA-
TION COMPLIES WITH COUNTY ORDINANCES. 
Sandy's claim that the County has no master plan for the 
area in which the McDonald's restaurant is located, and 
therefore could not approve the development under the County 
zoning ordinances, is not correct. The Little Cottonwood 
Master Plan was approved by the County in 1976 and includes the 
area in which the McDonald's restaurant development is 
located- R.222, p. 1. The plan addresses both long- and 
short-term development concerns for the area with the primary 
emphasis on development for a ten-year period through 1985. 
R.222, p. 2. The text of the plan contemplates that additional 
commercial development would be appropriate near major 
intersections such as 10600 South and 1300 East as the area 
developed. R.222, pp. 5, 41. 
Much of the surrounding area has, in fact, developed 
since 1976. Sandy annexed the area immediately east of 
McDonald's across 1300 East and approved a major commercial 
mall. This action by Sandy was a significant change in the 
area contributing to the fact that the Little Cottonwood Master 
Plan is now outdated in some respects.5 This fact was taken 
The plan consists of both text and a map. The map in 
particular is outdated. R.222, R.83, 84. (Comments of County 
Planning Director, Jerold Barnes.) 
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into consideration by the County Planning Commission in 
approving the McDonald's development. R.220. 
The fact that the Little Cottonwood Master Plan is 
outdated in some respects certainly does not mean the County 
has no master plan. However, even if the County did not have a 
master plan for this area, it still had the right to approve 
the McDonald's development. This issue was decided by this 
Court in the case of Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 358 P. 2d 633 
(Utah 1961). In Gayland, the Court held as follows: 
...These practical considerations 
sustain our conclusions that the 
Legislature acted advisedly in not 
expressly providing that no zoning could 
be done prior to the adoption of a 
master plan, and that such was not its 
intention. 
Thus, even if the Little Cottonwood Master Plan is no longer 
totally viable, this did not legally prevent the County from 
approving development in the area included within the plan. 
CONCLUSION 
The approval by Salt Lake County of the McDonald's 
restaurant met all the requirements of the law and Sandy's 
belated attempt to stop development of the restaurant is 
without merit. Therefore, for the reasons stated herein, Salt 
6
 This Court has held that outdated master plans should 
be interpreted on the basis of the present factual situation. 
Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 410 P.2d 764 (Utah 1966). 
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Lake County asks that this Court affirm the decision of the 
District Court. 
DATED this u day of May, 1990. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
V < / ^ B y jhzx~—/ / Jjji^A^^ 
KENT S. LEWIS 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellees 
Salt Lake County and 
Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission 
R989 
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The Old Post Office, 4th Floor 
298 Twenty-Fourth Street 
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Walter R. Miller 
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Daniel W. Anderson, A0080 
Jodi Knobel Feuerhelm, A4570 
Diane H. Banks, A4966 
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A Professional Corporation 
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Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
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TytAKf. COUNTY 
i.-f,.-. .yCiatk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY CITY, A Municipal 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, A Political 
Subdivision of the State of 
Utah, SALT LAKE COUNTY PLANNING 
COMMISSION, MCDONALD'S 
CORPORATION, and JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 
DISMISS AND FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
AND MCDONALD'S CORPORATION 
AND MCDONALD'S CORPORATION'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE, AND 
DENYING SANDY CITY'S CROSS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C88-03898 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The hearing on McDonald's Corporation's Motion to 
Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment; McDonald's 
Corporation's Amended Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for 
Summary Judgment; Salt Lake County's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
Sandy City's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment; and McDonald's 
Corporation's Motion to Strike Affidavit and Appraisal of Gary 
Free came before this Court on Monday, April 10, 1989 at 10:30 
a.m. Jodi Knobel Feuerhelm and Diane H. Banks appeared on behalf 
of McDonald's Corporation ("McDonald's"); Christopher Fuller and 
Walter Miller appeared on behalf of Sandy City ("Sandy"); and 
Kent Lewis appeared on behalf of Salt Lake County ("County"). 
The Court having reviewed the pleadings, affidavits, documents 
and exhibits filed by all parties on these matters, having heard 
the arguments of counsel, and otherwise being fully advised, 
hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows; 
1. McDonald's Motion to Dismiss is granted on the 
ground that Sandy's action is untimely as a matter of law under 
the doctrine of laches. 
2. Alternatively, McDonald's and the County's motions 
for summary judgment are granted on all of the claims asserted in 
Sandy's Verified Complaint filed herein. 
3. Sandy's claim under Section 10-2-418 of the Utah 
Code ("Section 418") fails as a matter of law based on the 
undisputed facts in the record, in that: 
a. the cost or value of land is not included in 
calculating cost projections under Section 418 of 
the Utah Code; 
b. the cost of furnishings, equipment and 
fixtures is not included in calculating cost 
projections under Section 418 of the Utah Code; 
c. the projected and actual costs of the 
McDonald's restaurant at issue are less than 
$750,000.00; and 
d. Sandy City had not expressed a willingness to 
annex the property that is the subject of this 
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lawsuit at the time that the McDonald's permit 
application was approved. 
4. As an alternative ground for granting McDonaldfs 
and the County's Motions for Summary Judgment, Sandy is 
collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues relating to 
its Section 418 claim, which were decided adversely to it in the 
litigation involving Chevron in Civil No. C87-07304. 
5. McDonald's Motion to Strike the Affidavit and 
Appraisal of Gary Free is granted as to the portions of Gary 
Free's Affidavit and Appraisal relating to the cost of equipment 
and improvements to the real property. The Court finds that the 
Affidavit and Appraisal fail to comply with Rule 56(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, in that the opinions contained therein are without 
foundation and are based on inadmissible hearsay. However, in 
ruling on the merits of the pending motions, the Court has 
considered and taken into account Mr. Free's Affidavit and 
Appraisal. 
6. There are no disputes of fact with respect to 
Sandy's Title 57 Claim, Agency Claim, and Ordinance Claim (as 
those claims are identified in the Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of McDonald's Motion to Dismiss or in the 
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Alternative for Summary Judgment) and the County and McDonald's 
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on those claims. 
7. Sandy's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment against 
the County and McDonald's is denied. 
8. Sandy's Verified Complaint is hereby dismissed 
with prejudice. 
DATED this O^^'day of Ap£Jl 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
»rick 
District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this / f day of April 1989, 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
to be mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Walter R. Miller 
Sandy City Attorney 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Kent Lewis 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
2001 South State Street, Suite S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84900-1200 
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Christopher C. Fuller 
Durbano, Smith, Reeve & Puller 
4185 Harrison Boulevard, Suite 320 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
^ I ^ ^ A M 
JKP:041189C 5 *x~ 
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.MAR 151988 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIS3&¥Gf,erK 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State of 
Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah, et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-87-7304 
Plaintiff's and derendants1 Motions for Summary Judgment 
came before this Court on the 5th day of February, 1988. All 
parties were represented by respective counsel. After argument, 
the Court took the matter under advisement. On the 25th day of 
February, 1988, Salt Lake County's Motion for Certification of 
Record came before this Court. The matter was taken under 
advisement, subject to plaintiff supplementing the record. After 
reviewing the file, Memoranda, record and arguments, the Court 
finds as follows. 
1. Salt Lake County Commission acted properly in rezoning 
the property in question, and was not in violation of any county 
ordinance or county master plan, and did not act arbitrarily and 
capriciously. Furthermore, Sandy City appears to have waived its 
right to object to rezoning. 
EXHIBIT WB" 
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2. Salt Lake County Planning Commission and Salt Lake 
County Commission properly issued a conditional use permit for 
development of the subject property. The project, based on the 
facts, is necessary and desirable, and not detrimental to the 
general welfare. Furthermore, the defendant Chevron Incorporated 
acted properly in processing its application through the only 
body with jurisdiction at the time, Salt Lake County. Sandy City 
did not have jurisdiction to accept the application. 
3. Defendants1 actions do not violate Utah Code Ann., 
Section 10-2-418. 
(a) Defendants1 development does not constitute "urban 
development" proposed within a restricted, unincorporated area. 
(b) Sandy City has not clearly stated it would annex 
the subject property, but only that it will consider annexation. 
It was not until the present lawsuit was filed that it indicated 
that it would annex the subject property. Even if Chevron 
petitioned for annexation and Sandy City annexed, there is no 
assurance Sandy City would approve Chevron1s application. 
Furthermore, Chevron is not required to petition Sandy City for 
annexation. 
(c) The value of the fixtures and personal property 
should not be considered. The projected cost of the proposed 
service station project is under $750,000.00. Furthermore, the 
application of Chevron should be considered a single development. 
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(d) Even if Chevron's application were not considered 
a single development, and were combined with McDonald's project, 
the project will still not exceed $750,000.00• 
(e) At this time Chevron has taken all the necessary 
procedures for approval of their application, and is ready to 
proceed with their project. 
4. Based on the facts before the Court, it appears that 
Salt Lake County Commission has conducted a hearing that 
comported with all due process requirements. It appears to have 
acted within the scope of its authority, has conducted hearings, 
and arrived at a decision, and does not appear to have acted in 
excess of its authority, or in a manner so clearly outside reason 
that its action must be deemed capricious and arbitrary* 
Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, 555 P.2d 
281 (1976) . 
5. Accordingly, it is the opinion of this Court that Sandy 
Cityfs Motion to Strike should be denied, and Sandy Cityfs Motion 
for Summary Judgment should be denied. Furthermore, all of the 
defendants1 Motions for Summary Judgment and Salt Lake Countyfs 
Motion for Certification should be granted. Counsel for 
defendant Chevron is to prepare an Order for the Courtfs 
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signature. Said Order should be approved as to fora by all 
parties. 
Dated this / *J — day of March, 1988. 
RAYMOND S. UNO 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
^ H.iDiXON HiMDLEY 
I VO:V-::;yC!i:r:< 
